24.
The Business Cycle
The business cycle is
the recurring prosperity and depression seen over economic history. Before the modern age of advanced
industrialism the prosperity could be accounted for by events such as good
weather yielding bountiful crops or the spoils of war from a military
victory. Likewise, depression
could be accounted for by harsh weather resulting in poor crops or from a
military defeat. In each case the
causes were fairly evident.
The modern business
cycle, however, needs a more sophisticated explanation as it is a more complex
phenomenon. Marxists believed that
business cycles were the inevitable collapsing of capitalism, but this theory
can be discarded since capitalism has not collapsed though socialism has. Keynesians account for the business
cycle by an appropriate level of spending (prosperity) or underspending
(depression) but have been baffled by the simultaneous occurrence of both
inflation and depression--a condition their theory treats as being as likely as
a square circle.
The Friedmanite
monetarists appropriately look to the money supply as the causal factor in the
business cycle though they fail to realize the ill effects of their favored
policy of a slow but steady increase in that money supply. (Friedmanites also fail to consider the
ethical aspects of such artificial increases in the money supply which create
involuntary transfers of wealth.)
The correct Austrian
theory of the business cycle also focuses on the money supply as the causal
factor, but does recognize the intervention in the economy that an artificial
increase in money and credit in fact is.
Basically, the Austrian theory recognizes that there is some voluntarily
chosen ratio of consumption to saving by the total of individuals comprising
the economy.
When an artificial
increase in the money supply through the banks occurs, this increases the
available money in savings and depresses the interest rate, thereby encouraging
an artificial increase in spending which is highly sensitive to the interest
rate--capital spending. This
run-up in the capital goods industry is the boom, and the subsequent depression
results when consumers reestablish their consumption to saving ratio--thus
revealing that the capital goods boom was indeed artificial. The only way to prevent the depression
is to pump another dose of new money into the system to maintain the higher
savings ratio, but eventually this must end or there will be a runaway
inflation.
The artificial
increase in the money supply therefore is a government subsidy--through
monetary policy--to the capital goods industry. Naturally the subsidy stimulates production in the capital
goods industry. Once that subsidy
is removed by consumers reestablishing their preferred saving ratio, there is a
crash in the capital goods industry.
The Austrians, in
contrast to all other schools of thought, do not regard the depression as bad
news, for it is the necessary correction to put production back in line with
consumers' preferences. This view
regards the preceding inflation as the ill setting the stage for the needed
correction. Two analogies follow
to clarify this theory:
Everyone understands
that a drug addict will need higher and higher doses of his drug to get the
same kick. This is comparable to
the growth in the money supply causing a capital goods industry boom. The addict has the choice of increasing
his doses of his drug until it kills him or of going cold turkey and suffering
the withdrawal pains. The
withdrawal pains are similar to the economy's depression adjustment.
Second analogy: If a person ingests poison into his
system he will need to rid himself of that poison, say through vomiting. It's obvious that the unpleasant vomiting
is the necessary cure for the evil of the poison ingestion. In this analogy the poison is the
inflation and the vomiting the depression.
From the Austrian
perspective the cure for the business cycle is a laissez-faire policy for the
money supply, letting the money supply be determined by the free choice of
individuals in the market. The
alternative to this Austrian policy is government involvement in money and
banking which inevitably results in special interest pressure to increase the
money supply to the benefit of those first receiving the new money--the banking
system itself.
-
Brown, Susan, et. al.
The Incredible Bread Machine,
(San Diego: World Research, Inc. 1974) pp. 30 - 33.
-
Browne, Harry
New Profits from the Monetary Crisis,
(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978) pp. 40 - 52.
-
Ebeling, Richard
The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle and Other Essays,
(Burlingame, California: The Center for Libertarian Studies, 1983)
-
Mises, Ludwig von
On the Manipulation of Money and Credit,
(Dobbs Ferry, New York: Free Market Books, 1978) pp. 57 - 107.
-
Rothbard, Murray N.
America's Great Depression,
(Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1972) pp. 11 - 77.
-
Skousen, Mark
The Structure of Production,
(New York: New York University Press, 1990)
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